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Power, Transport, Aviation and Water: the political 
economy of major infrastructure in the UK 
Miguel Castro Coelho, Institute for Government and Sebastian Dellepiane, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Evidence has been accumulating that UK infrastructure is under enormous pressure and 
is holding back economic growth. Although these problems have been receiving 
increasing attention from media and political commentators, there has been little effort 
to understand systematically their policy and institutional roots. This paper fills this gap 
by examining the political economy of infrastructure policy and presenting a series of 
case studies to illustrate our theoretical predictions. We find evidence that the British 
political system amplifies the risk of policy failure around infrastructure in the form of 
short-sightedness, policy instability, a weak evidence base and a lack of public consent.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Infrastructure1 plays an important role in facilitating economic growth and there is substantive 
evidence that suggests the UK economy is being held back by lack of investment, mainly in the 
transport and energy sectors (e.g. Novella et al. 2012). London, for example, has some of 
(XURSH¶VPRVWFRQJHVWHG roads, with the average driver in 2014 spending about 96 hours stuck 
in traffic2. Airport capacity constraints, especially in the South East of England, causes delays, 
cancellations and unreliability for passengers, driving up air fares, and damaging the 8.¶V
connectivity (Airports Commission, 2015). In the energy sector, the capacity margin has been 
declining, triggering a rush of costly policy initiatives and emergency regulatory measures 
designed to ensure the lights stay on (e.g. Helm, 2013, Ofgem, 2015). Shale oil/gas extraction 
through hydraulic fracturing3, which ministers and industry were hopeful might spark a 
revolution LQ %ULWDLQ¶V HQHUJ\ PDUNHW KDV EHHQ VHULRXVO\ KHOG EDFN E\ ORFDO FRPPXQLW\
opposition. 
 
There is prima facie evidence that these problems are intrinsically related to distortions in 
policymaking. For example, in the past decade and a half, energy policy has been notorious for 
failing to anticipate investment needs and providing a sound regulatory framework for private 
investors. Perennial controversies surrounding some of the most expensive infrastructure 
projects for the UK taxpayer, such as the planned, £50bn HS2 high-speed railway between 
                                         
1
 Broadly defined as capital intensive projects in energy, transport, water, digital communications, waste disposal 
networks, and strategic flood defences. 
2
 Based on data from http://inrix.com/scorecard/.  
3
 A technique in which water and chemicals are pumped into shale at high pressure to extract gas and oil. 
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London, the West Midlands, and the North of England are symptomatic of serious weaknesses 
in the way policymaking is grounded in technical evidence. The tortuous debate about aviation 
capacity in the South East of England which spans across more than four decades, and is yet 
WRSURGXFHDQHIIHFWLYHZD\RIWDFNOLQJFRQJHVWLRQLQWKH8.¶VPDLQLQWHrnational gateways, is 
a tale of the struggle of the British political system to successfully reconcile the widespread 
economic benefits of a large-scale infrastructure project with the perceived costs they bring to 
local communities. Local opposition to shale oil/gas extraction is another case in point. The best 
laid plans have often crumbled because of a lack of local community consent, and have led to 
an increasingly litigious environment, where judicial reviews and other legal challenges often 
play a decisive role. 
 
The paradox is that, despite the mounting evidence that points to pervasive policy failures, there 
has been little academic effort to connect these problems to the inner working of policymaking 
around infrastructure, and ultimately to the institutional architecture within which they operate. 
The few studies that come close to taking this approach have concentrated more on developing 
normative proposals for policy and institutional reform rather than offering a thorough 
examination of the pitfaOOVRIFXUUHQWSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVHVDQGWKHLULQWHUSOD\ZLWKWKH8.¶V
macro polity (e.g. Helm, 2013; Aghion et al. 2013; Armitt, 2013). 
 
This article aims to help fill this gap. Our key research aim is to provide a better understanding 
of the institutional roots of apparent policy failures in the area of infrastructure investment in the 
UK. To that end, we combine theoretical analysis and empirical evidence. At the theoretical 
level, we bridge literatures across academic disciplines to provide a new account of the political 
economy of infrastructure. At the empirical level, we present a series of case studies of recent, 
high-profile infrastructure investment decisions in the energy, transport and water sectors. 
Although these cases do not formally test our theoretical claims, they offer useful heuristics for 
illustrating how the identified mechanisms work in practice. Moreover, we are confident that, 
WDNHQWRJHWKHUWKHVHSDUDGLJPDWLFH[DPSOHVRIIHUDFUHGLEOHµSODXVLELOLW\SUREH¶*HRUJHDQG
Bennett, 2005) of the validity of our theoretical expectations.  
 
To anticipate the key arguments, our work shows that the British (and Scottish) polity is 
associated with important deficiencies in policymaking around infrastructure, mostly in the form 
of short-sightedness, instability, a poor evidence base and fragile public consent. The 
mechanisms driving this behaviour are threefold. Firstly, while in theory the UK Westminster 
model is expected to deliver stable, decisive government, in practice, the lack of consensus-
building capabilities undermines policy effectiveness where long-term commitment and 
credibility is crucial. Secondly, an adversarial political culture creates incentives for parties and 
interest groups to use information in ways that damage the quality of policymaking. Finally, 
electoral incentives expose decisions to the disproportionate influence of marginal 
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constituencies. Our core argument is that at the heart of these problems is a gap in the 
institutional architecture around infrastructure investment; that the UK lacks effective forums 
where politicians, experts, interest groups, and local communities can engage in structured, 
informed deliberation and negotiation around policy options.  
 
Our ultimate ambition is to lead a new generation of research LQWRWKHµSROLWLFVRISROLF\¶LQWKH
UK. The idea is to identify problems in the structure of incentives that underlie policy failures 
with an eye to frame a debate about possible institutional innovations and solutions. This is a 
critical contribution in its own right. As a case in point, the LSE Growth Commission called for 
the further investigation of the institutional constraints of the UK economy (Aghion et al., 2013). 
That said, our study may have analytical and comparative merits beyond the British case. For 
one thing, it offers a micro perspective into the link between institutions and economic 
performance. Existing scholarship on the political sources of growth and equality focuses mainly 
on the effects of macro, monetary and fiscal affairs (e.g. Persson and Tabellini, 2003). Yet, 
micro policy areas such as infrastructure policy are relatively neglected. Our contribution 
stresses the importance of allowing for the effects of a more finely-graded range of policy 
dimensions of economic prosperity. For another, this study may stimulate research into the 
interface between political economy (e.g. Besley, 2007) and political institutions (e.g. Lijphart, 
1999, 2012). Building bridges between these literatures is crucial for developing a more 
nuanced account of the incentives structure shaping public choices.  
 
The article is organised as follows. The next section examines the key economic and political 
constraints surrounding the formulation of infrastructure policy. Section two examines the 
political economy around infrastructure in the UK, reflecting on how we might expect the political 
system to perform in this area. Section three presents a number of case studies which illustrate 
our core arguments. Section four outlines key findings and policy implications, charting a way 
forward for reforming the governance of infrastructure investment.    
 
1.  The economics and politics of infrastructure 
 
Investment in infrastructure usually involves the creation of long-lived assets and high sunk 
costs, which in turn generate problems of time inconsistency/credible commitment. In other 
words, private investors will only be prepared to commit to financing these projects if future 
customers agree, in a long-term contract, to cover average costs and refrain from behaving 
opportunistically (e.g. Jamison et al., 2005; Trillas, 2010). In practice, such long-term contracts 
require governments, usually through regulators, to guarantee that future consumers will pay a 
price that reflects average costs. Government intervention is also required to handle a wide 
range of externalities that are typically associated with large-scale infrastructure projects, from 
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environmental impacts to disruption and congestion imposed on local communities where 
projects are sited. 
 
Making informed decisions about infrastructure investment is very challenging. It often involves 
long-WHUP FRPPLWPHQWV ZLWK SRWHQWLDO WR µORFN LQ¶ WKH HFRQRP\ LQ XQVXLWDEOH LQIUDVWUXFWXUH
systems for many years, seriously harming future economic prosperity (e.g. Bottini et al., 2013). 
Avoiding such an outcome requires robust analysis of the long-term effects of alternative 
infrastructure systems across a wide range of uncertain future scenarios. It entails 
understanding the drivers of demand for infrastructure services in the future, and how different 
infrastructure configurations might be able to meet that demand (e.g. Tran et al., 2014). It needs 
to consider the ways in which existing economic activities are likely to respond to new 
infrastructure investments, as well as how these investments may facilitate the emergence of 
new, potentially quite different, activities. This requires a strategic, network-oriented approach 
that goes well beyond a project-by-project analysis of specific investment proposals (e.g. 
Grimes, 2008, 2010). 
 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, most of the publicly available information about the (predicted) effects 
of large infrastructure projects on the economy and on specific groups is highly controversial. 
The assumptions and methodologies that influence the evaluation of policy options are almost 
invariably highly contestable and contested (e.g. Pindyck, 2015). The goals that projects seek 
to achieve and the interests they serve involve clear trade-offs, and as a result, are often subject 
to dispute (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Kalra et al., 2014).  
 
Conflicting interests, opinions and values make the politics of infrastructure investment 
especially difficult. To facilitate a constructive public and political debate, it becomes crucial to 
engage all the relevant affected groups in the development of the evidence base that is used 
to inform policy. Credible analysis requires a detailed understanding of public preferences 
regarding the policy trade-offs implicit in alternative investment options. Also, the methods and 
assumptions that underpin technical analysis need to be extensively discussed with relevant 
interested parties, as part of a deliberative process. Failure to foster this type of deliberative 
processes increases the potential for conflicting views about data, methods, system boundaries 
and optimisations to become polarised and undermine the quality of the political debate (e.g. 
%UXLMQDQG/HLMWHQ,WLQFUHDVHVLQSDUWLFXODUWKHULVNRI³LQIRUPDWLRQZDUV´ZKHUHLQWHUHVW
groups and political parties face incentives simply to draw on partial pieces of evidence to 
support pre-determined positions.  
 
Such a political environment of this kind creates poor incentives for the creation of successful 
infrastructure policy. First, it is likely to impact directly on the quality of the decision-making 
process that underpins the selection of individual projects (e.g. Glaister et al. 2006; Helm, 2010, 
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2014). Second, it often leads to policy risk and uncertainty which, in turn, affects the readiness 
of the private sector to invest, and/or the costs of capital required for investment to materialise. 
In particular, firms may decide to delay investments in long-lived, irreversible assets because 
of policy uncertainty, or as a risk mitigating strategy. They may demand a higher equity risk 
premium to compensate for increased risk of default and higher costs of external finance. They 
may also prioritise projects with shorter time horizons that offer a quicker pay-off. 
 
Some studies link elections to cycles in corporate investment (e.g. Julio and Yook, 2012; Gulen 
and Ion, 2013). Analysis of the US electricity industry indicates that firms invest less in new 
assets in states that have previously passed and repealed legislation to restructure the 
electricity industry, thus corroborating the hypothesis that regulatory instability reduces new 
investment (e.g. Fabrizio, 2012). Similarly, Cambini and Rondi (2014) find that political 
LQWHUIHUHQFHLQUHJXODWRU\IXQFWLRQVLVGHWULPHQWDOWRILUPV¶LQYHVWPHQW0RUHJHQHUDOO\WKHUHLV
a flourishing strand of literature that associates election periods, or other political changes, to 
increased stock market volatility (e.g. Bialkowski et al. 2008; Boutchkova et al., 2011, 2012); 
movements in bond yields; exchange rates; and equity volatility (e.g. Bernhard and Leblang, 
2006). 
 
Third, weak deliberative processes are also likely to fuel opposition from groups that incur, or 
are perceived to incur, costs during and/or following the construction of infrastructure projects 
± typically communities in the vicinity of infrastructure sites. This is further aggravated by a 
dearth of suitable institutional mechanisms to promote negotiation and agreement on the nature 
and extent of externalities caused by individual projects and ways to compensate for them  (e.g. 
Gibbons, 2014; Thompson, 2014; Ahlfeldt and Kavetson, 2014). 
 
Existing empirical studies indicate that opposition to development is often associated with 
FRPPXQLWLHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVDERXWSURMHFWV¶ULVNVDQGDERXWWKHIDLUQHVVRIWKHVLWLQJSURFHVVHV
HJ6FKLYHO\D2¶+DUH3HWURYD 2013). Objective risk assessments tend to pale 
next to the risk perceptions of the public. Lack of trust in government is often cited as a source 
of opposition to proposed projects. Suspicion between supporters and opponents of individual 
projects is another obstacle. Distrust of experts involved in discussions about where to place 
infrastructure facilities and doubts about the credibility of their evaluations are additional 
sources of opposition. In particular, conflicting, multiparty, communications about the effects of 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHIDFLOLWLHVULVNFUHDWLQJDQµLQIRUPDWLRQKD]H¶ZKLFKSURPSWVWKHSXEOLFWRVKLIWIURP
asking for additional information to becoming more entrenched in pre-conceived views about 
those facilities. 
 
A related literature highlights the importance of effective community participation in planning 
decisions. The design of participatory processes, including decisions about who participates 
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and when, the purpose of participation, how information is provided to participants, and how the 
SURFHVVLVRUJDQLVHGDOOVHHPWRLQÀXHQFHWKHTXDOLW\RISURMHFWSODQVDQGWKHLULPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
(Schively, 2007b; Grimes, 2005; Innes and Booher, 2010; Schenk and Stokes, 2013). These 
VWXGLHV SODFH DQ HPSKDVLV RQ WKH PHULWV RI D µFRQVHQVXV EXLOGLQJ DSSURDFK¶ ZKHUHE\
stakeholders are assembled for face-to-face facilitated dialogue, to assess the various 
GLPHQVLRQVRIDSURMHFWDQGWRVHHNFUHDWLYHRSWLRQVWKDWVDWLVI\HYHU\RQH¶VNH\QHHGVDQG
concerns. 
 
2.  The political economy of infrastructure in the UK 
 
The UK Westminster model has long been described as a paragon of majoritarian democracy 
(Lijphart, 1999, 2012). The prevailing narrative highlights a unitary and centralised state, 
³ZLQQHU-takes-DOO´HOHFWRUDO UXOHVDQGDSOXUDOLVWFRPSHWLWLYHconstellation of interest groups. 
Proportional representation is rejected in the name of clearly defined and easy-to-understand 
lines of accountability. The electoral system promotes concentration of power in single-party 
majority governments dominant before Parliament (Rose, 1974). The political culture often 
prizes confrontation over compromise (King, 2001)4. 
 
Against this background, one might be forgiven for anticipating UK governments to be defined 
by high organisational capacity, and decisive and coherent policymaking, possibly even geared 
for the long-term. A more careful examination, however, leads to an entirely different set of 
expectations.  
 
In fact, the institutional architecture of strongly-majoritarian democracies involves a credibility 
conundrum (Majone, 1996). With a relatively small number of veto players and future 
governments with different partisan agendas, current policies can be easily reversed. While this 
implies greater adaptability to shifting public preferences (e.g. Jennings and John, 2009; John 
et al., 2013; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005; Bartle et al., 2011), it can also undermine the 
consistency and predictability of policy, damaging its effectiveness, particularly in areas where 
long-term commitment/credibility is important. This problem is aggravated in the British political 
system with its ingrained tendency to a high turnover of both senior officials and Ministers in 
cabinet reshuffles (e.g. Kam and Indridason 2005; and Indridason and Kam 2006). 
 
Another important feature of the British political system is its intensely-partisan, adversarial 
culture, and reluctance to compromise (Hood, 2013; King and Crewe, 2013; Dellepiane-
Avellaneda, 2014). Together with a competitive interest group system (Lijphart, 2012), it creates 
perverse incentives for the use of information that can harm policymaking. This is further 
                                         
4
 This narrative has been qualified and in some cases contested (e.g. Bogdanor, 2009; King, 2010; Flinders, 2010; 
Jordan and Carney, 2013; Judge, 2014), but it still fits rather well the practice of politics and government in the UK 
(e.g. John et al. 2013; King and Crewe, 2013; Fukuyama, 2014). 
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FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH SHFXOLDULWLHV RI %ULWDLQ¶V HOHFWRUDO JHRJUDSK\ DQG VSHFLILFDOO\ WKH
disproportionate influence on policymaking of core and marginal constituencies (Johnston, 
1979; Johnston and Pattie, 1995, 2006; Ward and John, 1999; John and Ward, 2001; Besley 
and Preston, 2007; Ashcroft, 2010). 
 
Furthermore, there is no strong tradition in the UK of active consultation and engagement with 
local communities and other relevant stakeholders in policymaking, or compensation for the 
costs imposed upon them (e.g. Devine-Wright, 2011; Airports Commission, 2015). In practice, 
those left to make the case for infrastructure to local communities ± developers and government 
ministers ± are often the least trusted to do so (CBI, 2014).5 Too often the mechanisms of 
dispute resolution rely on legal challenges, public campaigns, political lobbying and public 
protest, leading to inefficient winner-take-all outcomes. 
 
None of these features fit well with the requirements for good governance of infrastructure 
investments. Policy credibility/commitment through wide cross-party consensus is of the 
essence to fostering investment in infrastructure. Yet, the British political system is designed to 
deliver alternation of powerful governments and ministers in government, with little incentives 
to negotiate and compromise. An intensely-partisan and adversarial culture, combined with 
numerous, competing interest-groups does not make for an environment that encourages and 
rewards rigorous assessment of policy alternatives and informed debate. And a weak tradition 
of engagement, deliberation, and compensation often motivates local communities and other 
stakeholders to oppose vehemently individual infrastructure projects.  
 
We would, therefore, expect infrastructure policymaking in the UK to be exposed to important 
failures in the form of policy instability, associated with lack of cross-party support and damaging 
incentives for private investors; inadequate consideration of policy alternatives leading to 
policies that are not grounded in firm empirical evidence; and failure to secure support/consent 
from sectors of society affected by proposed infrastructure projects. 
 
These failures are especially relevant considering that the UK needs to make major strategic 
infrastructure decisions over the next few years (NAO, 2013a; HMT, 2013). The investment 
needs come from climate change and energy security requirements (e.g. the UK is committed 
to a legally binding EU target to meet 15% of its energy demand from renewable sources by 
2020, and to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% in the domestic Climate 
Change Act 2008); compliance with policies aimed at protecting public health and the 
environment (e.g. wDWHUFRPSDQLHVDUH UHTXLUHGE\ WKH(8¶V:DWHU)UDPHZRUN'LUHFWLYH WR
                                         
5
 Only 15% of people surveyed in CBI (2014) trust the companies building a project to explain its advantages and 
disadvantages to the local area. Ministers were the least trusted group in the survey at just 6%. The most trusted 
group according to the polling consists of technical experts, attracting 54% of approval. 
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meet environmental quality standards); maintenance and replacement of existing infrastructure 
HJDILIWKRIWKH8.¶VH[LVWLQJHOHFWULFLW\JHQHUDWLQJFDSDFLW\LVSODQQHGWRFORVHRYHUWhe next 
decade); and coping with the pressure of rising population (the Office for National Statistics 
expects the UK population to increase to over 73 million people by 2035 ± ONS, 2014). 
 
It is also worth noting that the UK is rather unusual among advanced economies in the extent 
to which it relies on the private sector to finance and provide infrastructure, which exacerbates 
the damaging effects of the problems of credibility/commitment discussed above. Of the £375 
billion (bn) that the Government estimates as planned and potential infrastructure investment 
for the rest of the decade and beyond, about two thirds is expected to be financed from the 
private sector, a fifth from public sources and the rest from a mix of public and private finance. 
Energy sector projects (the most significant in value among the £375 billion) are planned to be 
almost entirely privately financed. Transport projects (the second largest planned infrastructure 
investment) should be financed roughly equally through public funds and public-private 
partnerships (HMT, 2013). 
 
3.  Case studies 
 
Electricity generation 
 
$QLPSRUWDQWSDUWRI%ULWDLQ¶VHQHUJ\JHQHUDWLQJFDSDFLW\KDVEHHQRULVLQWKHSURFHVVRIEHLQJ
decommissioned. Coal and oil-fired power stations are facing closure because of pollution 
control requirements associated with an EU directive on large combustion plants. Old nuclear 
stations are coming to the end of their cycles. At the same time, the EU renewables directive 
LPSOLHVWKDWDURXQGRI%ULWDLQ¶VHOHFWULFLW\ generation will have to come from renewables by 
2020. 
 
As a result of low (private) investment in new power plants, security concerns have been on the 
rise. Ofgem, the energy regulator, first sounded the alarm in a 2009 with references to an 
unprecedented challenge to secure supplies to consumers (Ofgem, 2013). In 2013, Ofgem 
stated that the margin between peak electricity demand and available supply could drop to 
between 2% and 5% by the winter of 2015-16, from more than 15% in 2011-µPDLQO\GXHWR
a significant reduction in electricity supplies from coal and oil generation plant, coupled with 
OLPLWHGLQYHVWPHQWLQQHZSODQW¶2I*HPS 
 
The situation reached a point that required the National Grid to pay companies to reduce their 
energy consumption during periods of peak demand ± typically between 4.00 pm and 8.00 pm 
RQZLQWHUZHHNGD\V7KHUHLVDOVRDQHZµFDSDFLW\PHFKDQLVP¶IRUJDV-fired power, under which 
generators are paid to keep their plants available as a back-up. And an array of government 
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initiatives have been designed to bring forward new (private) investment in power generation. 
These have included subsidising the private sector; giving guarantees; and moving 
infrastructure assets into state ownership (Helm, 2013). As things stand we face rising costs, 
rising emissions due to increased coal use, and a greater risk of supply insecurity. 
 
This is happening at the same time as energy prices are being drawn into a wider debate about 
the costs of living. This discussion has attracted a considerable amount of media attention, and 
has risen quickly in the political agenda, sparking references to tariff freezes, windfall taxes, 
and rolling-back subsidies for renewables. The result is heightened policy and regulatory 
uncertainty, which threatens to create a vicious circle of a high cost of capital, driven by high 
policy risk, leading to increases in energy prices which, in turn, lead consumers to put pressure 
on their political representatives to make policy changes. The prospect of policy changes raises 
policy risk further, and with it the cost of capital. 
 
The background to this is one of relative neglect, for more than a decade, of the conditions 
required for the private sector to invest in energy generation. After privatisation in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, there was a perception by many that energy markets were now to be treated 
like those of many other goods and services, i.e. subject to safeguards, but not in need of 
special attention. These were years of excess supply ± a legacy of the investments made in the 
1970s ± North Sea oil and gas, low prices and no serious climate change constraints (e.g. 
Pearson and Watson, 2012). Within Whitehall, energy policy was downgraded from having its 
own department in 1980 to being part of a wider portfolio of one junior minister in 1997. Changes 
introduced to the regulatory regime at the end of the 1990s mostly disregarded the need to 
incentivise the market to provide excess capacity and ensure security of supply. The New 
Electricity Trading Arrangements, later converted into the British Electricity Trading and 
Transmission Arrangements, are often credited for incentivising a short-run strategy based on 
µVZHDWLQJH[LVWLQJDVVHWV¶UDWKHUFDWHULQJIRUWKHORQJWHUPWKURXJKLQYHVWPHQWLQQHZSRZHU-
generating capacity (e.g. Helm, 2008). 
 
It was not until the mid-2000s, with increasing concerns about climate change and security of 
supply, that these perceptions were reversed. Episodes such as the winter of 2005-06, when 
the Russians interrupted gas supplies to the Ukraine for a number of hours, leading to a spike 
in gas prices and the UK nearly running out of gas, contributed to the reversal of perceptions. 
Expectations that energy supplied by old plants would be replaced by new offshore wind farms 
and nuclear reactors proved unfounded. A flurry of white papers, consultations and acts of 
Parliament followed. Yet, these processes were marked by delays and reversals. Security of 
supply, cost competitiveness, and environmental sustainability (the goals that are often 
associated with energy policy) found varying support among parties and even among the same 
JRYHUQPHQW &RPPHQWLQJ RQ QXFOHDU HQHUJ\ +HOP  S  QRWHV WKDW µ>I@RU  \HDUV
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JRYHUQPHQWVKDYHGHFLGHGWKDW WKH\GRQ¶WZDQWQXFOHDUDQGWKHQWKDW WKH\ do, that nuclear 
QHHGVQRSXEOLFVXEVLG\DQGWKHQWKDWLWGRHVDQGWKDWDZDVWHVROXWLRQVKRXOGEHIRXQG¿UVW
DQGWKHQWKDWLWLVQRWXUJHQW¶,QSUDFWLFHOLWWOHSURJUHVVZDVPDGHLQFUHDWLQJFRQGLWLRQVIRUWKH
private sector to invest in new supply. 
 
The approach that has dominated energy policy in recent years has also attracted criticism from 
independent experts and regulators. For example, in an interim report of an investigation into 
the energy market, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) criticised the subsidy that the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) awarded to offshore wind projects through 
DQ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH SURFHVV NQRZQ DV ³)LQDO ,QYHVWPHQW 'HFLVLRQ HQDEOLQJ IRU 5HQHZDEOHV´
VFKHPH),'H57KH&0$¶VDQDO\VLVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWhe support cost under the FIDeR scheme 
was 30% to 60% higher than that of similar offshore wind projects awarded through competitive 
DOORFDWLRQDIHZPRQWKVODWHU'(&&¶VGHFLVLRQPLJKWKDYHUHVXOWHGLQDQLQFUHDVHLQFRVWVIRU
consumers of approximately £250± £310 million per year for 15 years, equivalent to a 1% 
increase in retail prices (CMA, 2015). 
 
Crucial assumptions that underpin the current energy strategy, its impact on carbon emissions 
and on the competitiveness of the UK economy, have also been criticised. Concerns have been 
raised, in particular, about the idea that oil and gas prices are bound to go up in incoming years 
DVWKHLUVWRFNVDUHGHSOHWHGWKHµSHDNRLOJDV¶WKHRU\DQGWKHQRWLRQWKDWZLWKHQRXJKVXEVLG\
from consumers, the current generation of renewables is likely to become cost competitive, and 
make a difference to global warming (e.g. Helm, 2013). 
 
Furthermore, a number of independent analysts and commentators have expressed doubts 
about the impact of the current policy approach on costs for consumers and their willingness to 
support those costs. The National Audit Office, for example, has drawn attention to the fact that 
there has been no assessment of the overall impact of infrastructure on future bills or whether 
those bills will be affordable: 
 
µ7KHUHIRUH JRYHUQPHQW DQG UHJXODWRUV DUH WDNLQJ GHFLVLRQV RQ EHKDOI RI FRQVXPHUV LQ WKH
absence of full information about the situation for consumers. Affordability can only be assessed 
by taking into account all household bills, household incomes and wider costs of living. Gaps in 
analysis, and the lack of a common approach to measuring affordability, mean that the 
government does not have an overall picture of affordability, either for the average household 
RUIRUWKRVHRQORZLQFRPHV¶(NAO, 2013b, p. 9). 
 
In short, evidence has been accumulating that suggests that UK energy policy since 
privatisation in the 1980s has been short-sighted; that it has exposed private investors to 
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important policy risks that might have harmed investment incentives; and that strategic policy 
decisions have often failed to be grounded in strong technical analysis.  
 
Railways ± HS2 
 
+6LVWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VIODJVKLSWUDQVSRUWLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWWREXLOGDKLJK-speed rail line 
from London to Manchester and Leeds, via Birmingham, the East Midlands, Sheffield and 
Crewe, to begin operation in 2026 and be completed by 2032/3. The total cost of the scheme 
is currently estimated at £42.6 billion for both phases with an additional £7.5 billion for rolling 
stock (Butcher, 2014a). It was supported by the Labour Government in 2009 and has had the 
support of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government (2010-15) and the current 
Conservative Government, elected in 2015. 
 
Despite this cross-party support, it has been the subject of great controversy over the last few 
years. There have been heated public debates focused on the value of such large, expensive 
schemes and their ability to foster economic growth, particularly in the north of England. These 
debates have also been accompanied by more technical, detailed discussions on matters 
UHODWHGWRWKHUREXVWQHVVRIWKHGDWDDQGIRUHFDVWLQJXVHGLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VEXVLQHVVFDVH
for HS2; the impact on journey times, carbon emissions, homes, communities and habitats.  
 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) criticised the Department for Transport for making 
GHFLVLRQVµEDVHGRQIUDJLOHQXPEHUVRXW-of-date data and assumptions which do not reflect real 
OLIH¶ DQG KDYLQJ D ODUJH FRQWLQJHQF\ WKDW DSSHDUHG µWR EH FRPSHQVDWLQJ IRU ZHDN FRVW
LQIRUPDWLRQ¶3$&S 
 
&RPPHQWLQJRQWKHSURMHFW¶VSUHSDUDWLRQWKH1DWLRQDO$XGLW2IILFHVWDWHGWKDW 
 
High Speed 2 is at a very early stage of planning and development and, as such, we cannot 
conclude on whether the programme is likely to deliver value for money. The cost and benefit 
estimates in its economic case are uncertain and will change because the programme is at an 
early stage. Furthermore, there have been past errors in the underlying model and some key 
data needs to be updated. In presenting its case for investment, the Department has poorly 
articulated the strategic need for a transformation in rail capacity and how High Speed 2 will 
help rebalance economic growth. The Department and HS2 Limited have started a lot of work 
recently to strengthen the evidence and analysis on which the case is based. The challenging 
programme timetable, however, makes delivering this work difficult and increases the risks that 
the programme will have a weak foundation for securing and demonstrating success in the 
future. 
(NAO, 2013c, p.11).  
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The Treasury Select Committee published a report on the 2013 Spending Round and stated 
WKDWWKH7UHDVXU\VKRXOGQRWDOORZ+6WRSURFHHGµXQWLOLWLVVXUHWKHFRVW-benefit analysis for 
+6KDVEHHQXSGDWHGWRDGGUHVVIXOO\WKHFRQFHUQVUDLVHGE\WKH1DWLRQDO$XGLW2IILFH¶WKDW
WKH 7UHDVXU\ VKRXOG SXEOLFO\ TXDQWLI\ WKH EHQHILWV IRU +6 µQRW FDSWXUHG E\ WKH H[LVWLQJ
HFRQRPLFDSSUDLVDO¶ DQG WKDWSULRU WRDQ\GHFLVLRQ by the Treasury to proceed with HS2, it 
µVKRXOG SXEOLVK LWV RZQ FRPSUHKHQVLYH HFRQRPLF FDVH VXSSRUWLQJ LWV GHFLVLRQ¶ (Treasury 
Committee, 2013, p.36.) 
 
Commenting on the origins of High Speed 2 in the Financial Times, former Business Secretary, 
Peter Mandelson said: 
 
µ,QZKHQWKHWKHQ/DERXUJRYHUQPHQWGHFLGHGWREDFN+6ZHGLGVREDVHGRQWKHEHVW
estimates of what it would involve. But these were almost entirely speculative. The decision was 
also partly politically driven. In addition to the projected cost, we gave insufficient attention to 
WKHPDVVLYHGLVUXSWLRQWRPDQ\SHRSOH¶VOLYHVFRQVWUXFWLRQZRXOGEULQJ:K\"1RWEHFDXVHZH
were indifferent but because we believed the national interest required such bold commitment 
WRPRGHUQLVDWLRQ«:HZere focusing on the coming electoral battle, not on the detailed facts 
and figures of an investment that did not present us with any immediate spending choices. The 
vision was exciting, a lot of spadework had been done in the transport department and the 
cDELQHWDGRSWHG+6DVD³QDWLRQDOFDXVH´FRPSHWLQJZLWKWKHWKHQ&RQVHUYDWLYHOHDGHUVKLS
ZKRVHHQWKXVLDVPIRUWKHSURMHFWKDGSUHGDWHGRXURZQ¶ (Mandelson, 2013) 
 
In 2015, an inquiry of the House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee into the economics 
of HS2 concluded that: 
 
µ7KH*RYHUQPHQWKDV\HWWRPDNHDFRQYLQFLQJFDVHIRUSURFHHGLQJZLWKWKHSURMHFW«LWLVQRW
at all clear that HS2 represents the best, most cost-effective solution to the problems it is 
LQWHQGHG WRVROYH7KH*RYHUQPHQW¶V WZRGeclared objectives for the project are to increase 
capacity on the railway to meet long-term demand and to rebalance the economy by stimulating 
JURZWKLQWKHQRUWKRI(QJODQG«2QFDSDFLW\SXEOLVKHGVWDWLVWLFVRQFXUUHQWUDLOXVDJHGRQRW
suggest that there is an overcrowding problem on long-distance trains, either now or in the near 
future. On stimulating growth, the Government has not considered whether this could be better 
achieved by investing in improving regional links between northern cities. The Government 
claims that the biggest beneficiaries of the project will be business travellers, yet the evidence 
used to calculate the magnitude of this benefit (an estimated £40.5 billion) is out-of-date and 
unconvincing. Neither are we convinced why, if business travellers were the biggest 
beneficiaries from the project, they should not contribute more to the cost by paying higher 
IDUHV¶ 
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In the summer of 2014, while the controversy around HS2 was well underway, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer announced plans for a high-speed rail link between Manchester and Leeds 
DVSDUWRI FUHDWLQJ D µQRUWKHUQSRZHUKRXVH¶ 6 He implied the line could either involve a big 
upgrade to the existing trans-Pennine route between the two cities, or a construction of a new 
line, and aGPLWWHGWKHUHZDVQRVSHFLILFSODQEXWWKDWKHZDQWHGWRµVWDUWDFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶DERXW
ZKDWKDVEHHQGXEEHGµ+6¶ 
 
7KH LGHD RI FUHDWLQJ D µQRUWKHUQ SRZHUKRXVH¶ UHFHLYHG ZLGH VXSSRUW ,W LV LQ IDFW DQ LGHD
UHPLQLVFHQW RI WKH SUHYLRXV JRYHUQPHQW¶V µQRUWKHUQ ZD\¶ ± a collaboration between three 
northern regional development agencies, which the Coalition Government abolished ± that, in 
2011, drew a transport strategy stretching from Liverpool to Newcastle-upon-Tyne. But the idea 
of addressing connectivity problems in that region through a high-speed rail line sparked more 
controversy. Some commentators have drawn attention to the array of bottlenecks on existing 
URDGVDQGUDLOZD\VWKDWOLPLWWKHHIIHFWLYHVL]HRIWKHUHJLRQ¶VHFRQRP\FODLPLQJWKDW+6µLV
another multibillion-SRXQGVROXWLRQLQVHDUFKRIDSUREOHP¶)7HGLWRULDO 
 
7KHUHPDUNVHFKRRQHRIWKHNH\FRQFOXVLRQVRI(GGLQJWRQSµ6PDOOHUSURMHFWVZKLFK
unblock pinch-points, variable infrastructure schemes to support public transport in urban areas 
and international gateway surface access projects are likely to offer the very highest 
UHWXUQV«+RZHYHUODUJHSURMHFWVZLWKVSHFXODWLYHEHQHILWVDQGUHO\LQJRQXQWHVWHGWHFKQRORJ\
DUHXQOLNHO\WRJHQHUDWHDWWUDFWLYHUHWXUQV¶ 
 
Long lasting controversy around the building of a high-speed railway line connecting London to 
the North of England is a powerful illustration of the problems that emerge from failing to build 
a credible evidence base through deliberative/participatory processes, and relying instead on 
public and political debates shaped by party-political tactics and competitions between interest 
groups.  
 
Aviation in the South-East of England 
 
The question of UK airport capacity has been considered a number of times over the last forty 
years (Helsey and Codd, 2014). Yet, little progress has been made since those discussions 
began. The only new runways built in recent decades were at London City and Manchester 
airports. London airports still rely on runways that have been in place since the middle of the 
twentieth century. Heathrow is now effectively full. Gatwick is operating at more than 85% of its 
maximum capacity and completely full at peak times. The UK is reaching the limits of existing 
airport infrastructure (Airports Commission, 2015). 
                                         
6
 Greater Manchester and the Liverpool, Leeds and Sheffield city regions have a population of 9 million, a £154bn 
economy and almost 3 million jobs. 
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Capacity constraints at Heathrow are imposing high levels of delay and unreliability for 
SDVVHQJHUVOLPLWLQJWKHDLUSRUW¶VDELOLW\WRUHVSRQGWRRQH-off events, and to offer predictable 
patterns of respite from noise for local communities. In terms of connectivity, Heathrow still has 
a dominant position among European hubs on routes to North America and other established 
aviation markets, but it has not been able to establish a similar position in routes to emerging 
economies. Furthermore, the number of domestic routes to the airport is declining, restricting 
DFFHVVIURPRWKHU8.UHJLRQVWR+HDWKURZ¶VQHWZRUNRILQWHUQDWLRQDOVHUYLFHV 
 
The problem around the expansion of aviation capacity in the South East of England is 
intimately related to perennial controversies surrounding the impact of increased flights on noise 
and air pollution levels (especially nitrogen dioxide) in surrounding areas, compounded by lack 
of adequate compensation mechanisms. The two combined create strong incentives for the 
parties affected (often a relatively small, focused group) to mobilise and oppose new projects 
or expansion of existing infrastructure. Crucially, these groups tend to be in electorally important 
suburban constituencies. 
 
Opposition to the expansion of Heathrow airport is a classic example. In 2007, the Labour 
Government ran a consultation on this question, which included, among other proposals, plans 
by BAA to add a third runway. It did not take long for this process to come under severe criticism 
IURP UHVLGHQWV¶ FDPSDLJQ JURXSV ORFDODXWKRULWLHVDIIHFWHGE\ WKH SODQVQDWLRQDO FDPSDLJQ
groups, and a group of politicians from various parties. 
 
The response of the 2M Group ± DQ DOOLDQFH RI ORFDO DXWKRULWLHV DIIHFWHG E\ +HDWKURZ¶V
operating activities ± illustrates particularly well the consequences of failing to develop a 
constructive dialogue around the facts and figures that should inform negotiations and decisions 
FRQFHUQLQJLQIUDVWUXFWXUHSURMHFWV,WVWDWHGWKDWLWVPHPEHUVZHUHµQRWDQWL-Heathrow but feel 
passionately that the Government consistently fails to either acknowledge or assess the 
DLUSRUW
VIXOOHQYLURQPHQWDOLPSDFW¶,WZHQWRQWRVD\0*URXSS 
 
This has been an inadequate consultation from the start. Member authorities have incurred 
considerable expense in commissioning specialist consultants to examine the data and 
arranging extensive local information exercises to make good the deficiencies of the 
Department for Transport's (DfT) own programme. A number of our members have submitted 
their own responses to the consultation. None of us feels that our submissions are complete. 
We have all been hampered by the inadequacy of the information and the limited time allowed 
for analysis. The central issue here is one of trust. No one believes that this expansion will be 
the last. Stephen Nelson of BAA even admitted as much at the London Assembly Environment 
Committee evidentiary sessions. He could not rule out a fourth runway in the future. Our 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    15 
members are equally opposed to the third runway and the abandonment of runway alternation. 
No one believes that mixed mode is an interim measure. The history of Heathrow shows that 
once extra capacity is secured, it is never given up.  
 
In March 2008, The Sunday Times claimed that it had obtained documents under the Freedom 
RI,QIRUPDWLRQ$FWZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKHDLUSRUWVRSHUDWRU%$$KDGµFROOXGHGZLWKJRYHUQPHQW
RIILFLDOV WR ³IL[´ WKHHYLGHQFH LQ IDYRXURIDQHZWKLUG UXQZD\DW+HDWKURZ¶ 8QJRHG-Thomas 
Woolf, 2008). The Environment Agency, the environmental regulator, also raised doubts about 
WKH SURSRVDOV DQG LQ SDUWLFXODU µZKHWKHU WKH HFRQRPLF DQDO\VLV RI RSWLRQV IRU +HDWKURZ LV
UREXVW«ZHZRQGHUWRZKDWH[WHQWWKHDQDO\VLVKDVWDNHQDFFRXQWRIWKHRWKHUHOHPents of the 
Air Transport White Paper preferred strategy for south-east airports (e.g. a new runway at 
Stansted), and to what extent these elements may lead to the displacement of any of the 
LGHQWLILHGEHQHILWVRIH[SDQGLQJ+HDWKURZ¶($75S 
 
The 2010 Coalition Government set up an independent review that was asked to publish its 
findings after the 2015 general election. The Airports Commission, led by Sir Howard Davies, 
ZDVWDVNHGZLWKDGYLVLQJRQRSWLRQVIRUPDLQWDLQLQJWKH8.¶VVWDWXVDVDQLQternational hub for 
aviation and immediate actions to improve the use of existing runway capacity in the next five 
years. The Commission published its findings in July 2015, recommending a new runway at 
+HDWKURZ WRJHWKHU ZLWK D µVLJQLILFDQW SDFNDJH RI PHDVXUHV¶ WR PLWLJDWH LWV LPSDFW RQ ORFDO
communities and the environment, including a ban on all flights between 11.30pm and 6am, a 
legally binding cap on noise levels, a levy to fund a more generous compensation package for 
those living under the flight path, and an independent noise regulator. 
 
7KH*RYHUQPHQWSOHGJHGWRFRQVLGHUWKHFRPPLVVLRQ¶VILQGLQJVDQGJLYHDGHWDLOHGUHVSRQVH
by the end of the year. There is no guarantee that it will implement its recommendations. Senior 
figures in the Conservative party, such as Boris Johnson, mayor of London, Philip Hammond, 
the foreign secretary, and Zac Goldsmith, MP for Richmond Park (and prospective Conservative 
PD\RUDOFDQGLGDWHDOORIZKRVHFRQVWLWXHQFLHVVLWXQGHUWKHDLUSRUW¶VIOLJKWSDWKKDYHFRPH
out stURQJO\RSSRVLQJ+HDWKURZ¶VH[SDQVLRQ7KH/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVDQQRXQFHGLQ6HSWHPEHU
2014, before the Airports Commission published its analysis and recommendations that they 
ZRXOGRSSRVHRQHQYLURQPHQWDOJURXQGVDQ\IRUPRIDLUSRUWH[SDQVLRQµ:HUHPDLQopposed 
to any expansion of Heathrow, Stansted or Gatwick and any new airport in the Thames Estuary, 
because of local issues of air and noise pollution. We will ensure no net increase in runways 
across the UK as a whole by prohibiting the opening of any new runways unless others are 
FORVHGHOVHZKHUH¶/LEHUDO'HPRFUDWVS 
 
Problems with the expansion of airport capacity in the south-east of England offer a strong 
illustration of the consequences of failing to promote serious, interactive engagement with local 
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communities and to compensate them for the local costs that large infrastructure projects often 
involve.  
 
 
Sewerage - Thames Tideway 
 
Underneath the whole of London is a sewerage system designed by Sir Joseph Bazalgette and 
built largely in the 1860s. Large quantities of sewage had been flushing directly into the river 
Thames destroying its ecosystem. Increasing population levels aggravated the problem. A 
sewerage network of about 21,000km was then built underneath London between 1859 and 
1875. It served the 2.5 million people who were living in the city, and it was designed to 
accommodate an extra 1.5 million people living in London. Lately, it has been struggling to cope 
with a population of more than 8 million7.  
 
Hoping to resolve this problem, successive governments have, since 2007, supported the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIDEQ³VXSHUVHZHU´± a 25km long tunnel designed to boost the capacity of 
WKH/RQGRQ¶VVHZHUDJHQHWZRUNDQGSUHYHQW WHQVRIPLOOLRQVRIWRQQHVRIVHZDJHWKDWHYHU\
year overflow into the Thames. The project was granted planning consent in 2014. The Water 
Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) approved its financing in August 2015. Construction is 
planned to start in 2016 and is meant to last for seven years. It will be the second largest 
infrastructure project in the UK and one of the biggest in Europe.  
 
The idea of building the tunnel dates back to 2005, when a study commissioned by Thames 
Water reported on potential solutions for the lack of sewerage capacity in London. The study 
concluded that the only practicable strategy to meet all environmental objectives was the 
interception of sewage spills before they reached the river. For that purpose, it proposed the 
construction of a 25km tunnel, running from Acton in the west of London through to Abbey Mills 
in the east (the so-FDOOHGµ7KDPHV7LGHZD\7XQQHO¶DVSDUWRIDEURDGHULQYHVWPHQWSURJUDP
which included plans for another tunnel (a 6.9km long tunnel for taking overflows away from the 
river Lee), and upgrades to five existing sewage treatment plants. 
 
The proposal has been embroiled in controversy ever since it was announced. In 2005, Philip 
Fletcher, Director General of Ofwat at the time, argued that further study should be carried out 
before any commitment was made to the proposal. In 2006, he advised ministers that there was 
scope for improvement options that would offer better value for money8, and on the following 
year, insisted the Thames Tideway project was not cost-effective and that other options should 
be explored: 
                                         
7
 E.g. in October 2012, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the UK was in breach of the European 
Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive. This has raised the prospect of a large lump-sum fine and daily fines being 
levied on the UK until it complies with the Directive. 
8
 Letters from Philip Fletcher to Elliot Morley, 7th December 2005 and 14 February 2006. 
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"All the work done to consider yet further improvements to the Tideway demonstrates that it 
would not achieve value for money. Indeed, the evidence strongly suggests that the benefits 
would be very limited from the proposed sewer interceptor, whether in terms of health 
improvement, nuisance reduction, or environmental improvements. Any such improvements 
would not in any way be proportionate to the very high cost ± well over £2 billion."9 
 
Professor Chris Binnie, former chairman of the 2005 study that proposed the Thames Tideway 
solution, admitted years later that technical progress in sewage management had undermined 
the case for the project, and that alternatives should be considered. He challenged the cost-
benefit calculations presented by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
arguing that faulty assumptions were both overstating the benefits of the tunnel and 
underestimating the effects of alternative solutions. His latest analysis contends that the 
upgrade of the sewage treatment works together with the construction of the Lee tunnel, on 
their own, should be enough to fulfil the objective of protecting the environment from the adverse 
effects of water discharges (Binnie, 2014).  
 
Sir Ian Byatt, head of Ofwat between 1989 and 2000, has also stated publicly that the tunnel is 
QRW QHFHVVDU\ DQG FDOOHG LW µD UHDO GLVDVWHU¶ 3OLPPHU  $FFRUGLQJ WR 6LU ,DQ µQHLWKHU
Ministers nor regulators have set out the underlying analysis behind the Ministerial decision to 
opt for this solution. In the absence of this information, it looks as though alternatives have been 
EUXVKHGDVLGHE\0LQLVWHUVDQGWKDWUHJXODWRUVKDYHDFFHSWHGWKLVDVDIDLWDFFRPSOL¶%\DWW
2013, p.14)  
 
,QDQ µHDUO\UHYLHZRISRWHQWLDOULVNVWRYDOXHIRUPRQH\¶ WKH1$2DFNQRZOHGJHGWKH
FRQWURYHUV\DURXQGWKH7KDPHV7LGHZD\SURMHFWDQGVWUHVVHGWKDWµVXFKFODLPVHPSKDVLVHWKH
importance of independent government scrutiny and quality assurance over the options 
apSUDLVDOLQRUGHUWRZLQSXEOLFFRQILGHQFHWKDWYDOXHIRUPRQH\KDVEHHQVHFXUHG¶S7KH
FKDLU RI WKH 3XEOLF $FFRXQWV &RPPLWWHH 0DUJDUHW +RGJH FDOOHG WKH SURMHFW µD JROG-plated 
solution that will lumber London water tax-payers with an £80-a-year extrDELOO MXVW IRU WKLV¶
(PAC, 2014, p. 23) 
 
/DWHO\FULWLFVKDYHWXUQHGWRWKHWXQQHO¶VXQXVXDOILQDQFLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV$ERXWRQH-third of 
the project is expected to be funded by Thames Water, with the remaining £2.8bn cost to be 
met by a consortium composed of German insurer Allianz, Swiss Life Capital and Dalmore 
Capital. There were only two bids to finance and build the project, which has raised concerns 
about lack of competition in the selection of that consortium. They will own, manage and finance 
                                         
9
 Letter from Philip Fletcher to Ian Pearson 31st January 2007. 
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the project during construction, and will later supply sewerage services to Thames Water on a 
125-year concession. The investment will generate an income stream from day one, paid for by 
7KDPHV :DWHU¶V FXVWRPHUV 0HDQZKLOH WKH ULVNV RI FRQVWUXFWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ FRVW RYHUUXQV
DFFLGHQWVRURWKHULQFLGHQWVDWWKHSURMHFW¶VVLWHVWRJHWKHU with a range of financial risks (e.g. 
another global collapse in credit) will be borne by taxpayers as government is acting as 
guarantor (Plimmer, 2015; Ofwat, 2015a). 
 
The Thames Tideway Strategic Study originally estimated the cost of a single full-length tunnel 
at £1.7bn (2004 prices) and the increase in Thames Water residential customer bills at £40 to 
£45 annually. This was later revised by Thames Water to an estimated total cost of £4.2bn 
(2011 prices) and a maximum increase in bills of between £70 and £80 annually (NAO, 2014). 
In 2015, Ofwat announced that it expected the tunnel to have an impact on bills between £20 
and £25 (Ofwat, 2015b). 
 
In summary, the process that led to the approval of the Thames Tideway Tunnel offers a 
powerful illustration of how deficiencies in building a credible evidence base through active 
engagement of a wide range of stakeholders can give rise to conflicting analysis, continuous 
controversy, and eventually policy decisions of dubious quality. Indeed, when it comes to 
infrastructure policymaking, the British political system appears to struggle even with those 
projects that have cross-party support. 
 
4.  Key findings and policy implications 
 
Important challenges lie ahead for UK infrastructure. Energy security, compliance with 
environmental regulation, maintenance and replacement of existing infrastructure, and 
increasing population, are only a few examples from a wide range of pressures that will impact 
on UK infrastructure for decades to come. Successfully addressing these challenges will require 
large-scale investment. In contrast to most other developed countries, the UK relies extensively 
on the private sector to finance and provide infrastructure. Government still plays a pivotal role, 
however, both by designing policy and regulatory frameworks and by investing directly in 
individual projects, alone or in partnership with the private sector. Poor policy decisions could 
lock the economy into inadequate and/or overly-costly infrastructure systems for many years to 
come, placing a heavy burden on future prosperity. 
 
The evidence reviewed in this paper suggests there are important problems in the way the UK 
makes strategic infrastructure decisions. These include short-sightedness; lack of cross-party 
agreement which exposes private investors to high levels of policy risk; deficiencies in the 
development of the evidence base that underpins projects with cross-party support; and failure 
to secure public consent, which often leads to political procrastination. Many of these problems 
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appear to be largely associated with the absence of institutions that effectively engage 
politicians, experts, interest groups and local communities in the policymaking process. Without 
credible, participatory processes, the politics around infrastructure investments in the UK is 
often trapped by unconstructive interactions between party-political tactics, pressures from 
interest groups, and hostility from local communities.  
 
There are several international examples of infrastructural innovation from which the UK could 
learn. The United States has been experimenting for several decades with ways of making 
consumers, or their representatives, take a more active role in the regulatory processes through 
constructive engagement, and negotiated agreement and settlement. In the Netherlands, the 
so-called Alders Table ± a consultative body responsible specifically designed to formulate 
advice to government on plans for Schiphol airport ± was successful in creating a forum for 
national and municipal governments, representatives of local communities, and parties involved 
in aviation to come together and discuss mutually-advantageous solutions. The success of that 
initiative inspired the creation of similar consultative bodies across the country. In France, the 
Commission Nationale du Débat Public ± a state-funded, independent body ± has been playing 
an important role in ensuring the public participates effectively in decision-making processes 
about projects that have major effects on the environment and land use. The work of the 
Australian Productivity Commission has also been praised for its role in fostering informed 
public and political debates through a mixture of solid research and public input and scrutiny. 
Within the confines of current constitutional architecture, these examples of institutional 
innovation may offer the best guides for reforming the governance of infrastructure investment 
in the UK. 
 
,Q 2FWREHU  WKH 8. *RYHUQPHQW DQQRXQFHG WKH ODXQFK RI D µ1DWLRQDO ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH
&RPPLVVLRQ¶ DQ LQGHSHQGHQW ERG\ WKDW LV VXSSRVHG WR HQDEOH ORQJ WHUPVWUDWHJLF GHFLVLRQ
making to build effective and efficient infrastructure for the UK. If the Commission manages to 
replicate some of the best practice of the international examples mentioned above, it could play 
an important role in filling the institutional gap that we discussed in this paper. 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    20 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council for 
providing financial support to this study. 
 
References 
 
2M Group, Letter to Right Honourable Ruth Kelly MP, Secretary of State for Transport, 27 
February 2008, retrieved 26 November 2014 from 
http://www.wandsworth.gov.uk/download/downloads/id/1283/2m_response_to_the_dft_consul
tation. 
 
Aghion, P., Besley, T., Browne, J., Caselli, F., Lambert, R., Lomax, R., Pissarides, C., Stern, 
N., and van Reenen, J., Investing for Prosperity: Skills, Infrastructure and Innovation, London 
School of Economics Growth Commission, 2013, London. 
 
$KOIHOGW*	.DYHWVRV* µ)RUPRU IXQFWLRQ"7KHHIIHFWRIQHZ sports stadia on property 
SULFHV LQ /RQGRQ¶ Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A (Statistics in Society), 
177(1), 2014, p. 169-190. 
 
Ashcroft, M., Minority Verdict, Biteback Publishing, London, 2010, retrieved 9 January 2015 
from <http://www.lordashcroft.com/pdf/minorityverdict.pdf> 
 
Airports Commission, Airports Commission: final report, 2015, London. 
$UPLWW - µThe Armitt Review An independent review of long term infrastructure planning 
FRPPLVVLRQHGIRU/DERXU¶V3ROLF\5HYLHZ¶/RQGRQ 
 
Banks, G., 3XEOLF,QTXLULHVLQ3ROLF\)RUPXODWLRQ$XVWUDOLD¶V3URGXFWLYLW\&RPPLVVLRQ, Address 
WR WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO :RUNVKRS $XVWUDOLD¶V 3XEOLF ,QTXLU\ ([SHULHQFH DQG (FRQRPic System 
Reform in China, China-Australia Governance Program, Beijing, 2007. 
 
Banks, G., Return of the Rent-Seeking Society, Stan Kelly Lecture 2013, The Economic Society 
of Australia, Victorian Branch, Melbourne, 2013. 
 
Banks, G., & Carmichael, B., 'RPHVWLF 7UDQVSDUHQF\ LQ $XVWUDOLD¶V (FRQRPLF DQG 7UDGH
Reforms: The role of the Commission, paper presented to the Lowy Institute and Tasman, 2007.  
 
Bernhard, W., & Leblang, D., Democratic Processes and Financial Markets: Pricing politics, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 2006. 
 
Besley, T. & Preston, I., Electoral Bias and Policy Choice: Theory and evidence, Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, London, 2007. 
 
%LDONRZVNL - *RWWVFKDON . 	 :LVQLHZVNL 73 µ6WRFN PDUNHW YRODWLOLW\ DURXQd national 
HOHFWLRQV¶Journal of Banking and Finance, 32, 2008, p.1941-1953. 
 
%LQQLH & µ7KDPHV 7LGHZD\ ± 5HYLHZ RI 7LGHZD\ VSLOOV DQG WKHLU HQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW¶
December 2014. 
 
Bogdanor, V., The New British Constitution, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009. 
 
%RWWLQL1&RHOKR0.DR-µ,QIUDVWUXFWXUHDQG*URZWK¶/RQGRQ6FKRRORI(FRQRPLFV
Growth Commission.  
 
%RXWFKNRYD 0 'RVKL + 'XUQHY $ 	 0ROFKDQRY $ µ3UHFDULRXV SROLWLFV DQG UHWXUQ
YRODWLOLW\¶Review of Financial Studies, 25(4), 2012, p. 1111-1154. 
 
%UXLMQ+	/HLMWHQ0 µ&RVW-benefit analysis and the wider economic benefits from mega-
SURMHFWV¶ LQ 3ULHPXV+)O\YEMHUJ % 	:HH% HGV Decision-Making on Mega-Projects: 
Cost-benefit analysis, planning and innovation, Egward Elgar, 2008, chapter 5.  
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    21 
 
%XFNODQG5	)UDVHU3µ3ROLWLFDODQGUHJXODWRU\ULVNLQ8.HOHFWULFLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ¶Journal of 
Regulatory Economics, 19(1), 2001, pp. 5-25. 
 
Butcher, L., High Speed Rail (London-West Midlands) Bill: Bill no 132-I & 132-II, 2013-14, 
House of Commons Library, Research Paper 14/24, 2014a. 
 
Butcher, L., Railways: High speed rail (HS2), House of Commons Library, standard note SN316, 
2014b. 
Butter, F., & Wolde, S., The Institutional Economics of Stakeholder Consultation: Reducing 
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQVFRVWV WKURXJK³0DWFKLQJ=RQHV´ Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, No. 
11-162/3, 2011. 
 
Buuren, A., Boon, F., & 7HLVPDQ*µ&ROODERUDWLYHSUREOHP-solving in a complex governance 
V\VWHP$PVWHUGDP$LUSRUW6FKLSKRODQGWKHFKDOOHQJHWREUHDNSDWKGHSHQGHQF\¶Systems 
Research and Behavioural Science, 29, 2012, p. 116-130. 
 
%\DWW,µ7KDPHV7XQQHO$&ULWLTXHRID )ODZHG3URMHFW¶$XJXVW 
 
CAA, Airport Regulation looking to the future: Learning from the past, Civil Aviation Authority, 
2004, London.  
 
CAA, Airport Regulation: The process for constructive engagement, Civil Aviation Authority, 
2005, London.  
 
CAA, CP3 Price Control Review for NERL: CAA consultation, Civil Aviation Authority, 2008, 
London. 
CAA, Airport Regulation: Lessons learnt from Q5 price control process and improvements for 
Q6, Civil Aviation Authority, 2010, London. 
 
CBI, Building Trust: Making the public case for infrastructure, Confederation of British Industry, 
2014, London. 
 
CMA, Energy market investigation: summary of provisional findings report, Competition and 
Markets Authority, 2015, London. 
 
CNDP, Background and mandate, Commission 1DWLRQDOHGX'pEDW3XEOLF´3DULV 
 
'HFNHU & µ7KH FRQVXPHU NQRZV EHVW Involving consumers in regulatory processes and 
decision-PDNLQJ¶Network, 2013, p. 1-10. 
 
Devine-:ULJKW 3 µ3XEOLF HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK ODUJH-scale renewable energy technologies: 
%UHDNLQJWKHF\FOHRI1,0%<LVP¶Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2(1), 2011, 
p. 19-26. 
 
Dellepiane-$YHOODQHGD6µ7KH3ROLWLFDO3RZHURI(FRQRPLF,GHDV7KHFDVHRIH[SDQVLRQDU\
ILVFDOFRQWUDFWLRQV¶British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 2014. 
 
'RXFHW-	/LWWOHFKLOG6µ1HJRWLDWHGVHWWOHPHQWVDQGWKH1DWLRQDO(QHUJ\%RDUGLQ&DQDGD¶
Energy Policy, 37, 2009, p. 4633-4644. 
 
Douglas, M. & Widavsky, A., Risk and Culture: An Essay on the selection of technological and 
environmental dangers, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1983. 
 
Eddington Review, The Eddington Transport Study: The case for action ± 6LU5RG(GGLQJWRQ¶V
advice to government, HM Stationery Office, 2006, London. 
 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    22 
EATR, Response to the Department for Transport's Consultation: Adding Capacity at Heathrow, 
2007, Environment Agency Thames Region, 22 November 2007, retrieved 26 November 2014 
from http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090205022244/http:/www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/heathrow_1980743.pdf 
 
)DEUL]LR . µ7KH HIIHFW RI UHJXODWRU\ XQFHUWDLQW\ RQ LQYHstment: Evidence from renewable 
HQHUJ\JHQHUDWLRQ¶The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organisation, 29(4), 2012, p. 765-798. 
 
)HOORZV* µ1HJRWLDWHGVHWWOHPHQWVZLWKDFRVWRIVHUYLFHEDFNVWRS7KHFRQVHTXHQFHV IRU
GHSUHFLDWLRQ¶Energy Policy, 39, 2011, p. 1505-1513. 
 
Flinders, M., Democratic Drift, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B., ed., Megaproject Planning and Management: Essential Readings, vols 1-2, 
2014, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. 
 
FT Editorial, 'Better ways to link up northern cities: Prioritise connectivity to enhance regional 
prosperity,' Financial Times, 2014, 23 June, retrieved 26 November 2014 from 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b6269ad4-fae2-11e3-8959-00144feab7de.html#axzz36z8Yv4j3 
 
)XNX\DPD ) µ$PHULFD LQ 'HFD\¶ Foreign Affairs, 2014, retrieved 29 January 2015 from 
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-08-18/america-decay> 
 
Gibbons, S., Gone with the wind: valuing the visual impacts of wind turbines through house 
prices, Spatial Economics Research Centre Discussion Paper 159, London School of 
Economics, 2014. 
 
Glaister, S., Burnham, J., & Travers, T., Transport Policy in Britain, second edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006. 
 
Grimes, A., The 5ROHRI,QIUDVWUXFWXUHLQ'HYHORSLQJ1HZ=HDODQG¶V(FRQRP\, Paper presented 
to Institute of Policy Studies Spring 2008 Lecture Series: New Zealand: Future Maker or Future 
Taker? Wellington, 2008. 
 
*ULPHV$µ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH1HZ)LQGLQJVIRU1HZ=HDODQG¶, Policy Quarterly, 6(4), 2010, p. 3-
8. Retrieved 26 November 2014 from http://ips.ac.nz/publications/publications/show/306. 
 
Grimes, M., 'HPRFUDF\¶V,QIUDVWUXFWXUH7KHUROHRISURFHGXUDO fairness in fostering consent, 
Doctoral Thesis, Department of Political Science, Gothenburg University, 2005, Sweden. 
 
Gulen, H., & Ion, M., Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment, Social Science Research 
Network, 2013. Retrieved 26 November 2014 from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2188090. 
 
+DXVPDQ&DQG.HOORJJ5µ:HOIDUHDQG'LVWULEXWLRQDO,PSOLFDWLRQVRI6KDOH*DV¶%URRNLQJV
Papers on Economic Activity, 2015, BPEA Conference Draf. 
 
Helm, D., Credible Energy Policy: Meeting the challenges of security of supply and climate 
change, Policy Exchange report, London, 2008. 
 
+HOP'µ*RYHUQPHQWIDLOXUHUHQW-VHHNLQJDQGFDSWXUH7KHGHVLJQRIFOLPDWHFKDQJHSROLF\¶
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 26(2), 2010, p. 182-196. 
 
+HOP' µ%ULWLVK LQIUDVWUXFWXUHSROLF\DQGWKHJUDGXDOUHWXUQRI WKH6WDWH¶Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 29(2), 2013, p. 287-306. 
 
+HOP'µ6WXPEOLQJWRZDUGVFULVLV¶Prospect Magazine, April 2013, London. 
 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    23 
+HOP' µ7KH5HWXUQRIWKH&(*%"%ULWDLQ¶VFHQWUDOEX\HUPRGHO¶Energy Futures Network 
Paper, no 4, 2014.  
 
Helm, D., Phillips, J., & Smale, R., 7RR*RRGWREH7UXH"7KH8.¶V µTXRWHV¶FOLPDWHFKDQJH
record, 2007. Retrieved 26 November 2014 from http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/node/656 
Helsey, M., & Codd, F., Aviation: Proposals for an airport in the Thames Estuary, 1945-2014, 
House of Commons Library Standard Note SN/BT/4920, London, 2014. 
 
HM Treasury, Infrastructure Plan 2013, London, 2013. 
 
Hood, C., The Blame Game: Spin, Bureaucracy, and Self-Preservation in Government, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2013. 
 
HOUSE OF LORDS Economic Affairs Committee, The Economics of High Speed 2, 2015, The 
Stationery Office, London.  
 
Indridason, I. & .DP& µ&DELQHW5HVKXIIOHVDQG0LQLVWHULDO'ULIW¶British Journal of Political 
Science, vol. 38, 2006, pp. 621-656. 
 
Innes, J., & Booher, D., Planning with Complexity: An introduction to collaborative rationality for 
public policy, Routledge, 2010.  
 
Innes, J., & Gruber, J., (2001), 3ODQQLQJ6W\OHV LQ&RQIOLFWDW WKH6DQ)UDQFLVFR%D\$UHD¶V
Metropolitan Transportation Commission: Working paper 2001-09, Institute of Urban and 
Regional Development, University of California at Berkeley, 2001. 
 
Jamison, M. /\QQH + DQG %HUJ 6 µ0HDVXULQJ DQG 0LWLJDWLQJ 5HJXODWRU\ 5LVN LQ 3ULYDWH
,QIUDVWUXFWXUH,QYHVWPHQW¶The Electricity Journal, 18(6), p. 36-45. 
 
Jennings, W. & -RKQ3µ7KH'\QDPLFVRI3ROLWLFDO$WWHQWLRQ3XEOLFRSLQLRQDQGWKH4XHHQ¶V
VSHHFKLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶American Journal of Political Science, vol. 53, no. 4, 2009, pp. 
838-54. 
 
John, P., Bertelli, A., Jennings, W. & Bevan, S., Policy Agendas in British Politics, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013. 
 
-RKQ3	:DUG+µ3ROLWLFDO0DQLSXODWLRQLQD0DMRULWDULDQ'HPRFUDF\&HQWUDOJRYHUQPHQW
WDUJHWLQJRISXEOLFIXQGVWR(QJOLVKVXEQDWLRQDOJRYHUQPHQWLQVSDFHDQGDFURVVWLPH¶British 
Journal of Politics & International Relations, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, pp. 308-39. 
 
Johnston, R., Political, Electoral and Spatial Systems, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1979. 
 
-RKQVWRQ5	3DWWLH&µ7KH,PSDFWRI6SHQGLQJRQ3DUW\&RQVWLWXHQF\&DPSDLJQVDW5HFHQW
British ElectioQV¶Party Politics, vol. 1, no. 2, 1995, pp. 261-73. 
 
Johnston, R. & Pattie, C., Putting Voters in Their Place: Geography and elections in Great 
Britain, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006. 
 
Jong, B., The Airport Assembled: Rethinking planning and policy making of Amsterdam Airport 
Schiphol by using the Actor-Network theory, Eburon Academic Publishers, Delft, The 
Netherlands, 2012.  
 
-RQJ%	%RHOHQV/ µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ$PVWHUGDP$LUSRUW6FKLSKRO WKURXJKFRQWURYHUVLHV¶
Systems Research and Behavioural Science, 31, 2014, p. 3-13. 
 
-RUGDQ*	&DLUQH\3µ:KDWLVWKH³GRPLQDQWPRGHO´RI%ULWLVKSROLF\PDNLQJ"&RPSDULQJ
PDMRULWDULDQDQGSROLF\FRPPXQLWLHVLGHDV¶British Politics, 8(3), 2013, pp. 233-59. 
 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    24 
Judge, D., Democratic Incongruities: Representative democracy in Britain, Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, 2014. 
 
-XOLR%	<RRN<µ3ROLWLFDOXQFHUWDLQW\DQGFRUSRUDWHLQYHVWPHQW¶The Journal of Finance, 
67(1), 2012, p. 45-83. 
 
Kalra, N., Hallegatte, S., Lempert, R., Brown, C., Gill, C., & Shah $ µ$JUHHLQJ RQ UREXVW
decisions: New processes for decision-PDNLQJ XQGHU GHHS XQFHUWDLQW\¶ :RUOG %DQN 3ROLF\
Research Working Paper No. 6906, 2014. 
 
.DP&	,QGULGDVRQ,µ7KH7LPLQJRI&DELQHW5HVKXIIOHVLQ)LYH:HVWPLQVWHU3DUOLDPHQWDU\
6\VWHPV¶, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2005, pp. 327-63. 
 
King, A., Does the United Kingdom Still Have a Constitution?, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001. 
 
King, A., The British Constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010. 
 
King, A. & Crewe, I., The Blunders of our Governments, Oneworld Publications, 2013. 
 
Liberal Democrats, Pre-Manifesto: A stronger economy and a fairer society enabling every 
person to get on in life, 2014, Retrieved 26 November 2014 from 
https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/libdems/pages/6272/attachments/original/1409941645/
Pre-Manifesto_3_Sep_2014.pdf?1409941645 
 
Lijphart, A., Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, 
Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1999. 
 
Lijphart, A., Patterns of Democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries, 
second edition, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2012. 
 
/LWWOHFKLOG6µ&RQVXPHU-LQYROYHPHQWH[SRVWUHJXODWLRQDQGFXVWRPHUDSSHDOPHFKDQLVPV¶
Ofgem RPI-X@20 Web Forum, London, 2009. 
 
Littlechild, S., Regulation, Customer Protection and Customer Engagement: Working paper 
1119, Electricity Policy Research Group, Cambridge University, 2011. 
 
Majone, G., Temporal Consistency and Policy Credibility: Why democracies need non-
majoritarian institutions, European University Institute, Florence, 1996. 
 
Mandelson, P., 'Why I no longer support a new high-speed railway line for Britain', Financial 
Times, 2 July 2013, retrieved 26 November 2014 from http://tinyurl.com/mscrdwc. 
 
NAO, Infrastructure Investment: The impact on consumer bills, National Audit Office, Report by 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC812-I, London, 2013a. 
 
NAO, HM Treasury: Planning for economic infrastructure, National Audit Office, Report by 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC595, London, 2013b. 
 
NAO, High Speed 2: A review of early programme preparation, National Audit Office, Report by 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC124, London, 2013c. 
 
NAO, Thames Tideway Tunnel: Early review of potential risks to value for money, National Audit 
Office, Report by Comptroller and Auditor General, HC168, London, 2014. 
 
1HOVRQ - µ0HWD-analysis of airport noise and hedonic property values: problems and 
SURVSHFWV¶Journal of Transport Economics & Policy, 38(1), 2004, p. 1-28. 
 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    25 
1RYHOOD%&RHOKR0DQG.DR-µ,QIUDVWUXFWXUHDQG*URZWK¶SDSHUSUHSDUHGIRUWKH
London School of Economics Growth Commission, London.  
 
3OLPPHU* µ&ULWLFVGHFU\FRVWVRI/RQGRQ¶VEQ©VXSHUVHZHUª¶)LQDQFLDO7LPHV
July 26. 
 
2¶+Dre, M., Environmental and Other Co-benefits of Developing a High Speed Rail System in 
California: A prospective vision 2010-2050, UCB Center for Environmental Public Policy 
Working Paper, December 2010. 
 
Ofgem, Electricity Capacity Assessment Report: Report to the Secretary of State, Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets, 105/13, London, 2013. 
 
Ofgem, Electricity Capacity Assessment Report: Report to the Secretary of State, Office of Gas 
and Electricity Markets, London, 2014. 
 
Ofgem, Electricity security of VXSSO\$FRPPHQWDU\RQ1DWLRQDO*ULG¶V)XWXUH(QHUJ\6FHQDULRV
for the next three winters, 2015, Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, London,.  
 
Ofwat, Explanatory memorandum to the Project Licence issued to Bazalgette Tunnel Limited, 
2015a, The Water Services Regulation Authority, Birmingham.  
 
2IZDWµ312IZDWDZDUGVOLFHQFHIRU7KDPHV7LGHZD\7XQQHO¶E$XJXVW7KH
Water Services Regulation Authority, Birmingham. 
 
ONS, National Population Projections: 2012-based projections, 2014, Office for National 
Statistics, retrieved 26 November 2014 from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/npp/national-
population-projections/2012-based-projections/index.html 
 
PAC, High Speed 2: A review of early programme preparation (22nd report of session 2013-
14), Public Accounts Committee, HC 478, 2013. 
 
PAC, Infrastructure Investment: The impact on consumer bills, House of Commons, Oral 
Evidence taken before the Public Accounts Committee, HC 943-I, London, 2014. 
 
Pearson, P., & Watson, J., UK Energy Policy 1980-2010: A history and lessons to be learnt, 
Parliamentary Group for Energy Studies, London, 2012. 
 
3HWURYD 0 µ1,0%<LVP 5HYLVLWHG 3XEOLF DFFHSWDQFH RI ZLQG HQHUJ\ LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶
Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 4(6), 2013, p. 575±601. 
 
3LQG\FN5µ7KH8VHDQG0LVXVHRI0RGHOVIRU&OLPDWH3ROLF\¶NBER Working Paper 
No. 21097. 
3UDVVHU6µ2YHUFRPLQJWKH³:KLWH(OHSKDQW´6\QGURPHLQ%LJDQG,FRQLF3URMHFWVLQWKH3XEOLF
DQG3ULYDWH6HFWRUV¶LQ:DQQD-HGImproving Implementation Organisational Change and 
Project Management, ANU E Press, 2007, chapter 5, p. 47-68. 
 
5HXYHQ\5µ'HPRFUDF\DQG(QYLURQPHQW6WDWH RIWKHDUWDQGIXWXUHUHVHDUFK¶LQ6HVVLRQ
Democracy and the Environment: Defining the linkages, Conference on Environmental 
Governance and Democracy ± Institutions, public participation and environmental sustainability: 
Bridging research and capacity development, Yale University, New Haven, 2008. 
 
Rhodes, C., Infrastructure Policy, House of Commons Library, Standard Note SN/EP/6594, 
2013. 
5RELQVRQ7$	7D\ORU03µ7KHHIIHFWVRIUHJXODWLRQDQGUHJXODWRU\ULVNLQWKH8.HOHFWULFLW\
distribution industry, Annals of Public and Co-operative Economics, 69(3), 1998, p. 331-346. 
 
Rose, R., Politics in England: An interpretation, Little, Brown, Boston, 1974. 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    26 
 
6FKHQN7	6WRNHV/µ7KHSRZHURIFROODERUDWLRQ(QJDJLQJDOOSDUWLHVLQUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\ 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUHGHYHORSPHQW¶IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, 2013, p. 56-65. 
 
6FKLYHO\&µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJWKH1,0%<DQG/8/8SKHQRPHQD5HDVVHVVLQJRXUNQRZOHGJH
base and informing future research, Journal of Planning Literature, 21(3), 2007a, p. 255-266. 
 
6FKLYHO\ & µ$ TXDQWLWDWLYH DQDO\VLV RI FRQVHQVXV EXLOGLQJ LQ ORFDO HQYLURQPHQWDO UHYLHZ¶
Journal of Planning Education and Research, 27(1), 2007b, p. 82-98. 
 
6KLIHUDZ $ µ7KH 'XWFK SURMHFW JRYHUQDQFH V\VWHP :HDNQHVVHV DQG LPSURYHPHQWV LQ
Klakegg, O.J., Kjølle, K.H., Mehaug, C.G., Olsson, N.O.E.,  Shiferaw, A.T., Woods, R., (eds) 
Proceedings from 7th Nordic Conference on Construction Economics and Organisation 2013: 
Green Urbanisation ± Implications for Value Creation, Akademika Publishing, 2013. 
 
6RURND6	:OH]LHQ&µ2SLQLRQ3ROLF\'\QDPLFV3XEOLFSUHIHUHQFHVDQGSXEOLFH[SHQGLWXUH
LQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶British Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, no. 4, 2005, pp. 665-89. 
 
Thompson, R., The Crossrail Effect: The Impact of the Arrival of Crossrail on Central London 
Commercial Property Prices, London First, 2014.  
 
Tran, M., Hall, J., Hickford, A., Nicholls, R., Alderson, D., Barr, S., Baruah, P., Beavan, R., 
Birkin, M., Blainey, S., Byers, E., Chaudry, M., Curtis, T., Ebrahimy, R., Eyre, N., Hiteva, R., 
Jenkins, N., Jones, C., Kilsby, C., Leathard, A., Manning, L., Otto, A., Oughton, E., Powrie, W., 
Preston, J., Qadrdan, M., Thoung, C., Tyler, P., Watson, J., Watson, G. and Zuo, C., National 
Infrastructure Assessment: Analysis of options for infrastructure provision in Great Britain ± 
Interim results, Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford, 2014. 
 
Transparency Group Conference, Enhancing Transparency in the Multilateral Trading System, 
4 July 2007, Sydney 
 
Treasury Committee, Spending Round 2013: Third report of session 2013-14, HC 575, London, 
2013. 
Ungoed-Thomas, J., and Woolf, M., 'Revealed: the plot to expand Heathrow', 2008, The Sunday 
Times, 9 March, retrieved 26 November 2014 from 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/business/article82325.ece. 
 
Trillas, F., Independent regulators: Theory, evidence and reform proposals, IESE Business 
School, Barcelona, 2010. 
 
Ward, H. & -RKQ3µ7DUJHWLQJ%HQHILWVIRU(OHFWRUDO*DLQ&RQVWLWXHQF\PDUJLQDOLW\DQGWKH
GLVWULEXWLRQRIJUDQWVWR(QJOLVKORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶Political Studies, 1999, pp. 32-52. 
University of Strathclyde | International Public Policy Institute                                                              Occasional Paper 
April 2016                                                                                                                                                                    27 
About the authors:  
 
Miguel Castro Coelho is a Fellow at WKH,QVWLWXWHIRU*RYHUQPHQW+HOHDGVWKH,QVWLWXWH¶VZRUN
on economic growth in partnership with the London School of Economics and Political 
Science and the University of Strathclyde. 
 
Dr Sebastiean Dellepiane is a Lecturer in Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. 
Sebastian investigates and teaches in the area of political economy. 
 
Contact details: 
 
Miguel Castro Coelho 
Institute for Government 
2 Carlton Gardens, London SW1Y 5AA 
Miguel.Coelho@instituteforgovernment.org.uk 
 
  
Dr. Sebastian Dellepiane,  
School of Government and Public Policy 
University of Strathclyde 
sebastian.dellepiane@strath.ac.uk 
 
International Public Policy Institute (IPPI) 
McCance Building, Room 4.26 
University of Strathclyde 
16 Richmond Street 
Glasgow G1 1XQ 
 
t: +44 (0) 141 548 3865 
e: ippi-info@strath.ac.uk  
 
 
 
The International Public Policy Institute 
,33,LVWKH8QLYHUVLW\RI6WUDWKFO\GH¶VSULQFLSDOJDWHZD\WRSROLF\UHVHDUFKH[SHUWLVH,33,KDV
within it, several discrete policy centres: the Centre for Government and Public Sector Policy, 
the Centre for Health Policy, the Centre for Energy Policy, the Centre for Education and Social 
Policy and the Institute for Future Cities.  IPPI draws on expertise from across all four Faculties 
of the University ± Humanities and Social Sciences, Strathclyde Business School, Science and 
Engineering ± and from highly experienced practitioners who work with the Institute.  For more 
information, please see www.strath.ac.uk/ippi  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the place of useful learning 
www.strath.ac.uk/ippi  
ippi-info@strath.ac.uk  
University of Strathclyde Glasgow G1 1XQ 
 
 
The University of Strathclyde is a charitable body, 
registered in Scotland, with registration number SC015263 
